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CURRENT MONETARY AND BANKING
POLICIES IN NIGERIA AND THE
PROSPECTS IN THE THIRD REPUBLIC

l

V.A.ODOZI•

l

1

1
This paper mner«d and ,q,prruserl the amdµct ,f monetary and banking policies in Nigeria in
the recent pr,st, and charts II cmlible prognosis of fututt monetary policy directions, come the

Third Rqublic. As a bllckground inftmnation, the paper mner«d the amceptual, analytical and
institutional {rrannrork for the amtluct of monetary and banking policies in general, rwting the
frilesprtad consensus that efficient numagement of money stock and the related price variables
areflital instnunents for inducing inwstmentandgrowth ofany economy. An ~ o f recent

monetary and banking policies in Nigeria acknowledged the innouatiue initiatiuts taken so far
to reform the {inllnciM system and monetary management tq1f110IICh in general, but regrets the
rtlJltiue ineffecm,eness as refl«tetl '1y the outcome of intermediate policy targets.
Of ffllljor concem Wfft the n,pid expansion in money supply wer time, which fuelled inf"'tionlll'y
pmsu,es, high interest rain strucha'e and depreciated adrmige rr,tes of the Naira flis+tlis other
t1'fllW CUTl'fflcies.

Among the underlying {Actors which undermined monetary policy pursuits

Wfft aassitllt growth

in domestic credit especially to gwmm,ent, lack of timely data which coul4

guide timely mponse of monetary autlrorities to any deuefopment, inadequate monitoring of the
financial system, gif:ren the rapid expansion in the number of intermediaries and abot¥ all, the

unprmictable amduct of fiscal policies, which tended to compromise most of the monetary policy
initiatiuts.

T1rffe

problems may amtinue to J1fW drllllenges to future monetary and banking

policies, in a4tlition to the n«tl to crmte macrommomic incentitllts of appropriate interest and
adrmige rates which are amtlucitllt to inm;tment and growth. In amdusion, the paper noted
thtttalthoughNigerianuiyamtinuetoamtendwiththeseproblemsintheThirdRepublic,especially
thtttoffiscal deficit,, pressures on domotic price ln1el, balance of payments and depreciating naira
adrmig« rate a more stJlble ,esime would emerge in the medium term. This calls for fine-tuning ofcurrent policies, close collaboration among policy design and implementing institutions,
and a better understanding of how market~ted policies work.
• V.A. Odozi Ill the Deputy Governor, Domestic Monetaiy I. Banking Policy, Central Barut of Nieria

~' ,i
,.;..~ ..

.ODOZI

131

Financial deregulation in Nigeria over the last few yss, has tended to accentuate the
traditional controversy that surrounds the conduct of monetary policy, especially in periods
of monetary restraint. Unlike in the pre-SAP era, monetary policy since 1986 has had to
take into accoun't not only the traditional trade-off between short-term growth and domestic
price stability, but also the impact of monetary measures on both domestic interest rates and
thenaira exchange rate. In addition, the task of the monetary authorities has been compounded
by the pressures created by the government budget which have generally wealcened the
restrictive posture of monetary policy. However, major institutional reforms have taken place
in the money market in particular, which are expected to bring about a gradual improvement
in the effectiveness of monetary policy.
The purpose of this paper is to articulate the current approach to monetary policy
management in Nigeria and the future direction of policy, and to
the prospects for
greater effectiveness of monetary policy in the Third Republic. The paper is in four parts.
Part I discusses some conceptual issues in monetary management Part Il examines the
institutional structures for monetary policy formulation and implementation in Nigeria. Part
m focuses on the review and appraisal of policy while Part IV examines the challenges of
monetary and banking policies for the future and Part V presents the concluding remarks.

exanune

PART I
CONCEPTUAL ISSUES IN MONETARY MANAGEMENT
Before proceeding to the main issues in this part of the paper, some preliminary remarks
on the state of the art as regards monetary theory and practice is in order. In particular,
it seems necessary to stress that lively controversy over issues of interest to policy makers
continues' among the major schools of thought in macro-economics. Among the areas of
on-going debate are the nature of the impact of money stock changes on nominal and real
incomes in the short as well as the long-run, the question of whether the supply of money
is subject to the control of the monetary authorities or whether it adjusts passively to demand,
the issue of what the transmission channel of monetary policy is and the debate over whether
monetary policy should be based on a fixed rule or whether it should instead be a matter
of complete discretion of the monetary authorities. There are also the issues of the scope
for trade-offs in macro economic variables and objectives and the relative efficacy of monetary
versus fiscal policies.

132

CBN ECONOMIC & FINANOAL REVIEW, VOL. 30, N0.3

However, on a number of crudal issues, there seems to be enough convergence of views
to provide some guidance to policy makers. For example, apart &om the new classical school,
most others agree that money stock changes significandy affect nominal and real income
in the short-nm. Over t1)e long-run. the consensus appears to be that the main effect of money
stock changes is on the ·price level. It also seems clear that movements in money supply
impact on nominal and real interest rates in the short term,and that movements in real interest
rates influence savings and investment. Furthennore, to the extent that variations in money
supply growth cause variations in inflation and affect inflationary expectations, the exchange
rate will also respond in some way to monetary actions.
(a)

Objectives of Monetary Policy
In the formulation of monetary policy, therefore, some attention has to be given
to the likely impact of policy actions on inflation, exchange rate and/ or the balance
of payments, investment and growth. In addition, the overall state of the financial
markets is also of great relevance. In order to facilitate the presentation in Parts m
and IV of the paper the critical linkages are reviewed here.
(I)

Inflation
Domestic price stability may be regarded as themostaiticalgoalof monetary
policy. This is so for two reasons. First, low and stable inflation rates facilitate
the attainment of the major goals of macro-economic policy such as growth and
allocative efficiency. Second, monetary policy has its most enduring effect on
inflation. Its impact on nominal and real output is largely short-term. However,
thesestatementsdonotimplythatinflationhasonlymonetarycauses. InNigeria,
weather-induced variations in food supplies have without doubt been a major
non-monetary factor in the movement of the price level. The relatively large
and persistent naira depredation in the last few years has been a significant
contributoryfactorowingtothehighimportdependencyof thecountry. Nigeria's
inflation espec:ially in recent years could, therefore, have been significantly costpush in origin. Nevertheless, an inappropriate monetary policy regime could
reinforce the cost-push pressures and make matters worse by not producing the
necessary positive impact on domestic output.

(ii)

Exchange Rate
The exchange rate could be influenced by monetary impulses in a variety
of ways. First, an inflationary expansion of money supply could cause the
exchange rate to depreciate and deviate &om its equilibrium purchasing power

I
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parity (ppp) value relative to other counbies. Second, excessive monetary
expansion could,by raising inflationary expectations, induce speculative activity
against a currency and cause its depreciation ahead of the actual rise in the price
level. Third, excessive monetary expansion could, by inducing excessive absorption put pressure on the balance of payments. Under a freely floating
exchange rate regime, the overall effect of deficits in the balance of payments
in the short-run, would be mainly a depreciation in the domestic currency.
(iii)

Interest Rate
Monetary policy seeks to influence not only the availability but also the
cost of credit Hence the direction and magnitude of changes in marlcet interest
rates constitute a primary interest of moneta?y policy. The objective in this regard
often is to maintain the indicative marlcet rate or rates within a range compatible
with other objectives of policy such as growth. In effect, this means undertaking
interest rates targeting along side money supply targeting-a difficult combination
which is of current relevance in Nigeria.

(iv)

Investment and Growth
In conditions of substantial idle capacity and low underlying inflation,
monetary policy could, in the Keynesian framework, be employed to stimulate
aggregate demand and output in the short-run. This could be done by, for
example, inducing a fall in interest rates and thereby stimulating the demand
for interest rate sensitive consumption goods as well as private investment
demand. For long-term growth, however, monetary policy could best beof service
by seeking to maintain price stability. With a relatively low inflation rate, real
interest rates could be maintained at relatively low and positive levels conducive
to both savings and investment as well as stable exchange rates. In Nigeria,
sectoral creditguidelinescontinuetobeemployed topromotethegrowthobjective.
The aim of this tool of monetary policy is to ensure a significant share of total
bank credit to sectors considered vital for long-term growth.
In sum, the paramount all-embracing objective of monetary policy could
be said to be stable economic growth. However, as the foregoing discussion
makes clear, the major role of monetary policy lies in maintaining domestic and
external sector stability and thereby creating the macroeconomic conditions for
long-term growth.
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Conduct of Monetary Policy
The conduct of monetary policy is generally undertaken in three stages which
are closely inter-related. These are the policy formulation, implementation and review
stages. The tasks involved in policy formulation are essentially those of appraising
the recent past and the present, making some projections of the likeiy future trenc:ls
in the absence of policy changes and presenting a ran~ of options in the form of
policy targets. The implementation stage concerns the execution of the relevant
measures, while the review covers the developments in the ultimate targets of policy
such as output and employment, the general price level and the balance of payments,
as well as the movements in intermediate target variables such as the money stock,
bank a-edit and interest rates.
The policy options or alternative financial programmes are obtained from statistical exercises and aimed at providing estimates of the rates of money supply growth
required to support economic growth alo~ its potential path at stable prices and
sustainable balance of payments. As an initial step to obtaining the desired or
absorbable level of money supply, the demand for money in the coming year is
estimated and the estimate employed as a limit on the supply of money. In equating
the demand for and supply of money, excess or inflationary aggregate demand is
avoided and monetary growth as such ceases to be a cause of inflation.
With the desired level of money supply determined, estimates of the desired
level of a-edit are obtained on the basis ,of estimates of the other components of the
so-called balance sheet equation. These components are private sector credit, government sector a-edit, net foreign assets and other assets, each of these being the
consolidation of the balance sheets of the Central Bank and the commercial and
merchant banks. Two of these components, namely, government sector a-edit and
net foreign assets are policy variables whose levels set upper limits on the programme
level of private sector credit. The lower the level of Government sector deficit finan~
by the banking system, ceteris paribus, the higher private sector a-edit could grow
without causing an excessive growth of the money stock.

.

Expressed symbolically,
4 M2 = A Pc +Ge+ 4 NFA + 4 OA
Where M2 = Broad money
Pc
=
Private sector credit
=
Government sector credit
Ge
Net foreign assets
NFA =
Ii OA =
Other assets
Ii =
Change in
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The framework described above applied under the regime of monetary management based on direct instruments, which, as may be recalled, relied mainly on
the use of credit ceilings. With the gradual shift to the indirect system of monetary
management, a different approach to the design of monetary policy has become
appropriate. Under the new arrangement, the focus of Central Bank control shifts
from banking system credit to bank reserve balances.
The first step in the process of policy design still remains that of estimating the
level of money supply compatible with growth at stable prices. The next step consists
of making a forecast of money supply based on specified changes in the balance sheet
of the Central Bank. The latter estimate when set against the desired growth of money
supply, provides the target for monetary policy. In the more typical case, the estimates
will yield a monetary growth path indicating an excess of money supply over demand
as against the desire:i zero excess supply of money. Having obtained an estimate
of the likely level of excess money supply, the next step would be to derive the level
of primary or base money associated with the projected excess money supply and
consequently the level of bank reserves that needs to be injected or drained from the
system to keep money supply growth along the desired path. The exercise also involves
the setting of appropriate ranges for short-term interest rates which are pivotal to
the entire structure of interest rates. In this regard, however, certain conventions and
experiences are crucial and these will evolve only gradually.
A'discussion of policy instruments, which in the more common regime of indirect
monetary control is open-market operations, would be inappropriate at this point.
Suffice it to say that the success of the system would depend on the effective use
of this instrument by the Central Bank. 'Ilrls in turn depends critically on-the degree
to which the financing of Government could be kept separate from the Central Bank's
reserve management function. Also important is the existence in the financial system
-of an active secondary market in short-term securities.

PART II.
INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
The institutional arrangements within which monetary policy is formulated and implemented determine not only its form or character but also its effectiveness to an important
degree. These arrangements are the focus of this part of the paper. In particular, we will
examine the authority and role of the Central Bank, the formal and informal structures for
co-ordinating monetary and fiscal policies and the financial system as it relates to monetary
policy.
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The Monetary Authorities
The monetary authorities in Nigeria currently comprise the Central Bank of Nigeria
and the Ministry of Finance both of which are agencies of the Federal Government. While
the Central Bank exercises primary responsibility for articulating, implementing and appraising monetary policy, the Bank's authority is exercised subject to appropriate consultation
with the Government which has the legal power to override the Bank's proposals or actions.
Prior to 1988, Central Bank's policy actions in response to developments and policy pr6posals
in the context of the annual budget exercise of the Federal Government was presented to
the Government through the Minister of Finance. Since then, the Bank's initiatives, in line
with the autonomous status granted to it are channelled through the Presidency. It is pertinent
to note here, that Central Bank's autonomy is by no means unlimited. Since the Government
rather than the Central Bank.has overall responsibility for the economy,.there will be times
when the priorities of the Government may not be entirely consistent with the thrust of
monetary policy as viewed by the Central Bank. However, it remains true that the Government
places great weight on the judgements of the Central Bank on macroeconomic policy generally.
In the current Nigerian setting, the success of monetary policy hinges crucially on the
extent to which the budgetary programme of the Federal Government can be harmol)ised
with the goals of monetary policy. This is due to the critical role of the Government in the
economy and for this reason, the Government has continued to be the largest source of liquidity
·growth ii\ the system; The co-ordination of monetary and fiscal policy targets over the years
·has been undertaken within the framework of inter-agency meetings of the economic ministries
and departments, the Central Bank and a number of public sector organisations. At these
high-level meetings, Government revenue'projections, expenditure plans and policies, as well
as the overall level of budget deficit/surplus and mode of financing, as the case may be,
are considered and proposals forwarded to Government. This framework has worked
reasonably well at the policy formulation stage. However, closer co-ordination at the policy
implementation stage is desirable and will become more vital to the success of monetary
policy.

The Financial System
The structure and investment behaviour of institutions in the Nigeria11 financial system,
as in otlaer countries, are important determinants of the form, content and effectiveness of
monetary policy and a brief review of the salient features is necessary. Of particular relevance
are the banking system and the money market, both of which constitute the main institutional
channels by which monetary policy actions are transmitted to the real sectors of the economy.
Developments within both of these institutions in the last few years have created conditions
that should enhance the efficacy of monetary policy in the near future. The- banking §ystem
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has expanded at a -remarkable pace in the last few years and this has spurred greater
competition in the markets for primary non4'ank deposits and inter-bank call and term
deposits. The securities segment of the money market has also undergone significant change
with the adoption since 1989, of an auction-based system for the issue of Government treasury
bills and treasury certificates. By further advancing the process of deregulation, the auction
system paves the way for the emergence of an active secondary market for short and medium
term Government securities outside the Central Bank. However, owing to the limited scale
of participation of commercial and merchant banks, as well as. the non-bank public in the
market for Government securities, the Central Bank has had take-up and hold relatively
large amounts of these securities, thereby constraining its ability to employ market-based
fonns of monetary and credit control.

'°

PART III
REVIEW AND APPRAISAL OF POLICY
,

Our next task is to-undertake a brief review and appraisal of recent monetary and banking
policy measures which would form thebasisforfuturepolicyselection. The gradual movement
to indirect monetary control and deregulated banking system since 1986 has been motivated
by two major factors. The first is to encourage competition and efficiency in the·allocation
of financial resources, while the second is to complement the overall economic policy which
relies on market forces in the allocation of resources.

1.

Review of Policy
In order to achieve the broad objectives outlined earlier, a number of policy
measures were adopted. These measures embraced reforms in monetary and credit
management, interest rates and banking as explained below.
(a)

Monetaiy and Credit Management
From the inception of the SAP, the need to curb excessive bank credit
expansion to the economy was recognised in order to maintain an appropriate
monetary growth which would ensure stability in both the domestic and external
sectors of the economy and in particular to promote a smooth operation of the
foreign exchange market. To this end, the permissible rate of increase of commercial and merchant banks' loans and advances was generally reduced over
the years. One notable exception was in 1988 when the need to stimulate growth
and reduce mounting unemployment prompted an increase in the permissible
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credit expansion of banks.
In addition to direct credit control through variation in credit ceilings, a
series of indirect measures to control the ability of banks in extending new credit
were also applied.
These measures included:
the recall of naira counterpart of outstanding external payment
(i)
arrears to the CBN in_ 1986 and 1987;
mopping of excess liquidity through the issuance of Stabiliz.ation
(ii)
Securities since October 1990;
(iii)
increases in commercial banks' cash ratio requirement in 1989, 1990
and 1992;
(iv)
introduction of cash ratio requirement for merchant banks in 1990;
(v)
expansion from 1990 of the base for calculating the cash ratio
i\?q~ttoincludealldepositsinsteadofrestrictingittodemand
deposits as was the case prior to 1990;
(vi)
raising the liquidity ratio for commercial banks from 25 to 30 per
cent;
(vii)
varying the liquidity ratio for merchant banks from 30 per cent of
deposits and call moneyinJanuary-1988 to 20per cent of total deposit
liabilities currently;
(viii) transfer of public sector accounts from the commercial and merchant
banks to the CBN in May - June 1989; and
(ix)
prohibitionof commerciala.ndmerchantbanksfromacceptingforeign
guarantees and/or foreign currency deposits as collaterals for
domestic loans denominated in naira.
At the beginning of September 1992, indirect methods of credit and
monetary control received a boost with the selective li(ting of credit ceiling for
healthy (sound) banks. Apart from measures designed to influence total credit
expansion, there are other measures to re-direct credit to particular sectors
considered vital to economic growth. These include the prescribed allocation,
since 1987, of 16 and 35 per cent of commercial banks' total credit to agriculture
and manufacturing. Merchant banks' minimum credit targets to these sectors

have remained at 10 and 40 per cent since 1987. The prescribed minimum ratio
of commercial banks' deposits mobilized in the rural areas to be granted as loans
to finance activities in such areas was increased from 45 to SO per cent, while
the minimum of banks' loans to small-scale wholly-owned Nigerian enterprises
as a percentage of total loans was rais,ed from 16 to 20 per cent.

,
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Interest Rate
The posture of the Government to deregulate the economy in order tq
enhance competition and allocation of resources necessitated the introduction
of an interest rate policy based on market forces.· •Consequently, interest ra~
werederegulatedinAugust1987,therebygivingbanksafreehandindetermining
their deposit and lending rates according to market conditions. However, the,
Central Bank continued to fix the Minimum Rediscount Rate (MRR) which was
raised ,to 15 per cent in August 1987. In order to stimulate investment and growth
in the economy, the CBN reduced the MRR to 12.75 per cent in December 1987.
This was raised to 13,25 percentin 1989inlinewith the perceived need to moderate
monetary expansion. Subsequently, in a bid to remove distortions in the interest
rate structure, the CBN reached an accord with the banks on certain margins
between their deposit and lending rates late in 1989. Following that understanding, the spread between the savings deposit and prime le.nding rates for each
bank was fixed at 7 percentage points. The margin between the prime and highest
lending rates for each bank was fixed at 4· percentage points while the interbank rates were to be at least 1 percentage point below the prime lending rates.
Realising that the structure of deposit and lending rates had been largely
unresponsive to the observed decline in inflation in 1990 and the increase in
domestic liquidity, the monetary policy for 1991 fixed a maximum spread of
4 percentage points between their oostof funds and their ~ u m lending rates.
This directive was subsequently modified in January 1991, requiring banks to
observe lending rates of not more than 21 per cent and minimum deposit rate
of 13.5 per ~t. These prescriptions on interest rates were later removed in
January 1992 but banks have been required to observe a maximum spread of
5 percentage points between their average cost of funds and their maximum
lending rates more as a performance than mandatory target.

,(c)

Banking Sector
The development of an efficient financial sector, especially a competitive
and efficient banking system, has been oonsidered necessary for the success of
the Structural Adjustment Programme. Consequently, steps ·were taken to
reorganise the banking sector. Among the initial actions was the reduction of
existing numerous economic sectors into two broad categories - "priority" and
"other" sectors for the purpose of bank credit allocation. Another step taken
was the promotion of the expansion of the banking sector. There was a deliberate
effort to encourage the emergence of new institutions and the expansion of the
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existing ones. In the banking sub-sector, the procedure for licensing new banks
was eased to stimulate the growth of banks. To provide banking services l'O
the poor and others who have no access to the conventional banks, two innovative
banks - the People's Bank of Nigeria and Community Banks were established
in 1989and 1990,respectively. Anotherinstitution-theNigeria Deposit Insurance
Corporation (NDIO-was setup in 1988, but started operations in 1989, in order
to provide deposit insurance and enhance banking supervision.
Furthennore, new and far reaching supervisory and regulatory arrangements aimed at strengthening the banking system and promoting safe and sound
banking practices were introduced. In 1990, the· CBN issued some directives
to ~ aimed at enhancing their capital base and professionalism in bank
lending and provisioningfornon-performingaedits. Thedirectives wereprompted
by, among others, the rapid expansion of the banking industry, the increased
risk of bank failure, the problems of illiquidity and insolvency in the system
and the staggering level of non-performing loans, all of which resulted largely
from bad management of the banks. To crown it all, the Central Bank Decree
(No. 24), 1991 and Banks and Other Financial Institutions (BOFI) Decree (No.
25) of 1991 were promulgated to strengthen the foundation for a more stable,
efficient and sound financial sector. The new laws became necessary, firstly,
because of the need to cpnsolidate and harmonise the numerous amendments
to the existing banking laws. Secondly, the new.laws constituted an important
component of the broader programme of financial sector reforms aimed at
promoting competition and efficiency in the country's financial system.

2.

Appraisal of Policy
The impact of monetary policy may be assessed first in terms of the behaviour
of intermediate targets of policy and secondly in terms of the performance of the
ultimate targets such as output growth, price stability, savings and investment The
impact of policy on the latter set of variables is generally difficult to establish especially
for economies such as Nigeria Eor reasons, some of which were examined in the early
part of the paper. Other equally important constraints are the weakness of the available
statistics and the fact that monetary policy measures are employed all the time in
combination with various other policies whose effect are difficult to isolate. ·'There
are also the effects of purely exogenous factors such as large variations in export prices
and earnings and drastic weather changes affecting agricultural production and prices
which tend at times to dominate other influences on the economy. For these reasons,
the following discussion is focused mainly on the impact of policy on the intermediate

__ J
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target variables, namely, money supply and credit and variables such as interest rates,
the naira exchaQge rate and the price level in the •recent past.
(a)

Money and Credit
The effectiveness of monetary policy in regulating the money supply over
the years has 'depended to a large extent on Government spending and fiscal
deficit. Whenever fiscal policy was only moderately expansionary, money supply
growth usually fell in line with the direction of monetary policy. Excessive growth
in private sector credit had in recent years exerted much less influence on the
behaviour of the money stock. This is illustrated by the experience of the last
seven years. As the data in the accompanyingTable illustrate, the growth rates
in money ~upply were closest to target levels in those years such as 1986, 1987
and 1989 when net credit to Government rose only moderately (as in 1986 and
1987) or declined as in 1989. The sharp increases in money supply in 1988, 1990,
1991 and the first half of 1992 were associated with relatively large increases
in net credit to Government. The impressive deceleration in money supply to
21.S per cent in 1989 from 41.9 per cent in 1988 was substantially influenced
by the decline of 21.1 per cent in net credit to Government. This performance
would have been even better if the monetii;ation of oil receipts had stayed close
to the expected level. The acceleration in money supply growth from 1990
onwards, on the other hand, reflected the substantial growth in Government
expenditure and deficits, including debt service payments.
However, Government fiscal operations have not been the only source of
significant deviations of money stock growth from targets. Above-target of
private sector credit mainly .from commercial and merchant banks also contributed to the large increases in 1988 and from 1990 onwards. In sunt, the restrictive
stance of monetary policy was reasonably achieved in terms of intermediate
targets in 1986, 1987 and 1989 but not in 1988, 1990, 1991 and the first half of
1992. The data in the Table also indicate reasonable levels of compliance by
banks in respect of the sectoral credit guidelines. In the last three years, the
shareoftheprioritysectorsinbanks'aggregatecreditaveragedabout5percentage
points below the specified 50 per cent in the case of commercial banks and
exceeded the minimum as regards the merchant banks. The maturity distribution
of merchant banks' credit. however, consistently diverged significantly from the
prescribed levels, with the bulk of their credit being short rather than medium
or long-term as specified. Bothclassesofbanksconsistentlyexceeded the minimum
specified level of credit to small-scale wholly Nigerian-owned enterprises.
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(b)

Inflation
Asindicatedearlier,a primaryfocusof monetatypolicyis to facilitate growth
at stable prices. It is acknowledged that non-monetary or cost-push factors have
been present in the recei,.t Nigerian inflation experience and,· therefore, the
relationship between money supply movements and the price level had not been
on a one-to-one basis, to s.y the least. However; the association between the
two has been quite remarkable. The inflation rate rose sharply from 10.2 per
cent in 1987 to 38.3 per cent in 1988 as the growth in money supply rose also
sharply froin 13.7 to 41.9 per cent. The inflation rate increased further to 50.5
per cent in 1989, but the growth in money supply decelerated to 21.5 per cent
and fell steadily after July 1990. By end-December 1990, ~ inflation ra~ was
down to 7.5 per cent. Although money supply rose during the year by 44.9
per cent, the growth came only in the serond half of the year and especially
in the last quarter. In 1991 and first half of 1992, inflation rate stood at 13.0
and 27.0 per cent, respectively, as money stock increased by 32.6 and 26.5 per.
cent. 1:hus, it ap~s evident from this experience that money supply growth
has contributed or facilitated the sharp increases in the inflation rate in some
years and_ served as a restraining force in others.

Interest Rates
Following interest rate deregulation in August 1987, bank deposit and lending rates
moved upwards on average by about3 and6percentagepoints to 12.4 and 16.50,respectively,
\
and hovered at about the new levels until late 1989. The Central Bank in line with the objective
of deregulamn and its perception of the financial situation at the time, raised the treasury
bill rate and MRR to 14 and 15 per cent, respectively, with effect from 1st August' 1987.
At the end of December of that year, however, the CBN revised both these rates downwards
to 12.75 and 11.75 per cent, respectively, in response to signals from the market. ln January
1989, the Bank, once more, revised the MRR as part of a package of measures to combat
the spiralling inflation rate.
Through all of these, bank deposit and lending rates remained relatively stable. In late
1989, all rates began to climb apparently as a result of the adoption of a series of anti-inflation
measures including the transfer of public sector deposits from commercial and merchant
banks to the Central Bank. Commercial and merchant .banks' savings deposit. rates rose on
average by about 4 percentage points to 16.4 per cent, while the banks' prime lending ra~
rose on average by about 10 percentage points to 26.80 per cent. The wide differential between
savings and lending rates became a matter of great concern to the monetary autlt~rities and
led to the accord reached with the banks in November 1989 as noted earlier, for fixed spreads
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between savings deposit and prime rates, between prime and maximum lending rates and
bern:een inter-bank rates and prime lending rates. Banks generally responded to the accord
by raising both lending and deposit rates with some narrowing of the margins.
Although market interest rates were at historically high levels at the end of 1989, the
inflation rate was even Jugher and real interest rates remained negative. It was expected
that improvements in both bank liquidity and inflation would bring down interest rates to
much lower levels. Inflatibn peaked in July 1990 at just under 50 per cent and bank liquidity
generally improved. Despite both these developments, market interest rates showed no
perceptible decline. By year-end, the inflation rate had come down to 7.5 per cent and all
real rates had become substantially positive. It was this observed downward rigidity of market
interest rates and the potential adverse impact of this on investment and growth that led
to the interest rate measures taken in January 1991. In essence, these measures sought to
relate lending rates to banks' cost of funds and to bring down lending rates by inducing
a fall in deposit rates. Later developments showed that the benefits of this action were only
marginal and the CBN had to revert to the pre-1991 practice with regard to interest rate
determination.

Exchange Rate
Under the current floating exchange rate regime, the stability of the Naira exchange
rate is a major objective of monetary policy. An inflationary expansion of money supply
under the system, would not only exert an upward pressure on the domestic price level,
but also a downward pressure on the value of the Naira. This would happen either as a
result of an excessive expansion in the demand for imports and, therefore, foreign currency
or because inflationary expectations alter thecurrencypreferencesof economicagentsin favour
of foreign currencies. In practice, this shows itself in the foreign exchange demand pressure
on banks and a widening gap between the official and other markets for foreign exchange.
The wider this gap becomes, the more intense the speculative pressure on the official market.
Thus, while the large initial depredations of the Naira in 1986 and 1987 were mainly the
result of the previous overvaluation of the currency, subsequent movements in the exchange
value of the currency have been influenced by the high level of aggregate demand and
speculation.
Following the average nominal depreciations of 29.8 and 64.7 per cent in 1986 and 1987,
the Naira depreciated by a further 20.2 and 39.0 per cent in 1988 and 1989 amidst the sharp
increases in money supply growth and accelerating inflation. The deceleration in money
supply growth towards 1989 coupled with the steady drop in inflation helped to stabilise
the Naira which depreciated by only 8.1 per cent in 1990. The real Naira exchange rate showed
an average depreciation of 67.5 per cent between 1986 and 1990, with the bulk of the decline,
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averaging 45.0 per cent, occurring in 1986 and 1987. The real exchange rate appreciated
by 6.1 per cent in 1988 and depreciated by an average of 9.3 per cent yearly between 1989
and 1990. Given that the Naira float, like those of other currencies, has not been a clean
float, there is need for caution in relating the movement in the Naira exchange val~e to
movements in underlying factors. Nonetheless, theexperiencesofarunderscores the importance
of money supply movements on the Naira exchange rate.

PART IV
CHALLENGES FOR THE FUTURE
The foregoing review and appraisal have shown that in. spite of some gains made in
leforming Nigeria's monetary management and banking culture through innovative policy
measures, the most desired objectives, such as price stability and rapid growth with minimal
unemployment, are still elusive. There is anew consensus among economy watchers in Nigeria
that the problem is not so much in terms of formulating appropriate policies but rather in
resolving the conflicts and negative side effects of policy measures which constrain policy
implementation. These constraints constitute the major challenges for monetary and banking
policies now and in the years ahead as examined below.

1.

Rapid Growth in Domestic Liquidity
The relative calm which characterised the financial system in the first two years
of the SAP has given way to some destabilising movements in domestic liquidity.
This has adversely impacted on the naira exchange rate and aggravated inflationary
pressure. Uncertainty about future tendencies has diverted assets holdings to financial
instruments with short-term maturities and away from those with long-term maturities,
thereby i;educing the availability of funds for long-term investment. Besides, in a
high inflationary situation, prices and costs are volatile and may ~d wrong signals
to economic agents for efficient resource allocation. This underscores the importance
of stabilization for the success of monetary and banking policies under the structural
adjustment regime. One of the challenges in the years ahead is to halt the rapid growth
in liquidity which has impacted adversely on the naira exchange rate and domestic
price level. Although excess liquidity is linked directly with the monetisation of foreign
exchange and rapid growth in aggregate credit, the real problems are those factors
which influence these monetary aggregates. As already noted, the greatest problem
in this respect is the financing of large government deficits by the CBN. An elimination
of such deficit financing would bring stability to the money market. However, when
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it is realised that Federal Governmentdebtservicepaymentsconstitutethemajorsource
of government deficit, complete elimination of government deficit becomes difficult
without substantial reduction in the stock of debt. If debt service is reduced substantially and deficit financing by the CBN stopped, excessive growth in domestic
liquidity will be minimised. This development will in turn have some salutary effect
on the naira exchange rate and inflation.

2.

High Interest Rates
Another challenge posed to the authorities in the years ahead is the existence
of a high interest rate regime. Although interest rate deregulation has stimulated
competition and efficiency in resource allocation thereby paving the way for indirect
monetary control, it has, nevertheless, encouraged high lending rates which could
discourage investment in fixed plant and equipment. However, the high lending rates
could have been lower than the current levels but for the oligopolistic structure of
the system which permits a few banks to act as the dominant suppliers of funds to
the market. Since a few banks have most of the funds, each action by the Central
Bank to drain reserves from the system strengthens the bargaining power of these
institutions, resulting in higher interest rates, even when there is excess liquidity in
the system as a whole. The rise in the number of insolvent banks has worsened the
situation. A less skewed distribution of reserves would have led to lower and less
volatile rates of interest.

3.

Financing of Federal Government Deficits by the CBN
The greatest problem which has reduced the effectiveness of current monetary
and banking policies in Nigeria is the persistence of large Government deficit and
its mandatory financing by the CBN. The financing of Government deficits by the
CBN increases the monetary base and swells up the level of excess liquidity of the
banking system. But excess liquidity is inconsistent with the principle of fractional
reserve system and open market operations which constitute the basic elements of
indirectmonetarycontrolthatarebeingdevelopedforeffectivemonetarycontrolunder
the current deregulated financial environment. The use of stabilization securities for
mopping up excess liquidity has run into some problems because of the nature of
the excess liquidity. Where, as in Nigeria, the deficit financed by. the Central Bank
constitutes the major source of excess reserves in the banking system, mopping up
e'.!<ercise for monetary control may prove unsustainable. Attempts at mopping up
such excess liquidity through the issuance of stabilization securities tends to destabilise
the money market and put upward pressure on interest rates although at present there
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exists no viable alternative. For these and other reasons, there is need to reilign fiscal
policy which has been substantially expansionary with monetary policy whlch should
be neceaearily restrictive in the current economic: circumstances.

'-

MandatoryRoleoftheCBNinUnderwritingTreasuryDebtlnslruments
The mandatory role of the CBN in the Ul)derwriting of primary issues of government securities has continued to mnstrain. its ability to regulate the reserves of
the banking system. The Bank has had to underwrite new issues of treasury securities
on occasions when the stance of policy would have required a reduction in its portfolio.
The problem is likely to remain as long as rapid growth in government securities
is allowed to a>ntinue while the size of institutional investors in the market remains

limi1ed.
Related tothelimitedshareofinstitutionalinvestorsinpimaryissuesof govemment
securities, is the small size of the secondary market in these securities. The right~
usual practice of banks to rediscount their holdings of government securities with
the CBN makes it difficult for the Bank to regulate the reserves of. t h e ~ system.
Action taken by the CBN to reduce the reserves of the banks will always be offset
if the banks decide to rediscount their holdings of debt instruments with the CBN.
This underscores t,he need. to have an active secondary market outside the ~tral
Banlt where banks in need of liquidity a>Uld discount their holdings of government
securities. The ad-vent of Dismunt Houses, three of which had already teceived CBN's
approval&-in-prindple should remedy the situation.

5.

Scarcity of Professional Staff
Largely as a result of the recent rapid growth in the number of financial institutions, the industry is presently beset with such problems as scarcity of professional
staff, poor management, increase in the number and oomplexityof fraudulent practices
and inadequate infrastructure. The dearth of managerial staff has resulted in frequent
staff turnover, especially at the executive level and has exacerbated the problem of
frauds, weak internal controls and frequent mntravention of statutory regulations.
All these have contributed to the rise in the number of insolventbanks. More intensive
training programmes in the banking iAdustry could assist in this regard. This is clearly
a serious challenge to the financial sector managers.

~

DataConstraints
Another major mnstraint to the current monetary and banking policies, espedally
with the limited introduction of indirect monetary management, is that most of the
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required data are not yet available on weekly and daily basis while some of those
available on monthly basis have uncomfortable time lags. Data from banks are
obtainable mainly on monthly basis while weekly and daily series are not fully
developed. One of the major reasons why these daily and weekly data are not readily
available is the inadequate computerisation of the activities in the banking system.
Although much progress has been made in this regard, there is need to step up efforts
not only to computerise individual banks but also to develop an integrated electronic
information system for the banking system as a whole. An important area where
there is inadequate data is government fiscal operations which are needed by monetary
policy makers for planning purposes. Consequently, the CBN relies on estimates in
analysing government fiscal operations. Since the lags for some of the relevant data
are large-sometimes spanning some years-the validity of the estimates get weaker
over the years. Besides, there are other data series, such as GDP and inflation figures,
generated outside~ banking system, which monetary authorities require for planning
purposes but cannot get promptly.
PART V
CONCLUDING REMARKS

In my concluding remarks, I intend to highlight what I consider to be some of the leading issues
in macroeconomic management generally and monetary policy specifically, in Nigeria. In this
exercise I shall attempt to anticipate some of your questions and concerns:
(i)

The objectives of macroeconomic policy in Nigeria all through the years have been
basically the same, namely: growth and development; price stability; balance of
payments viability; employment generation; improvement in the standard of
living; income redistribution etc. However, the priorities, focus and strategies
have changed from time to time. Another valid general observation is that the
country has the ability to formulate good policies on paper but inability to
in)plementthem. That is the "Achilles' Heel"-the missing link of macroeconomic
management in Nigeria.

(ii)

My experience in policy fonnulation and implementation has been humbling a unique learning experience - on the basis of which I respectfully assert that
there are no "quick fixes" nor magic formulae for solving intractable economic
problems. Economic reforms do require time, persistent and consistent effort,
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proper sequencing, sacrifices and patience, mass participation and democratisation, in addition to resources, in order to succeed.
Consequently, there is need for realism, pragmatism and flexibility in policy
design and implementation. Periodic reviews and corrective action in the light
of experience are necessary if policy implementation must remain relevant and
on track i.e. consistent with the goals of policy and the priority needs of the
country.
(iii)

It should be stressed that given the circumstances of the country namely, the
scarcity of resources, the high oil and import dependency and consequent
vulnerability of the country to externally-generated shocks, the prevalence of
rigidities and distortions and, above all, the record of failure of the past regime!;
of sbingent trade and exchange regulations, there is no viable alternative to
comprehensive, robust and sustained.economic reform such as is being pursued
under the aegis of the SAP. The alternative scenarios and frameworks, the most
respectable of which is the AAF-SAP (African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment for Socio-Economic Recovery and Transformation), based as
they areon there-enactment of the regime of controls and protectionism (not even
managed trade) as well as overly simplistic assumptions about the resource
profile, appear rather qubcotic in an age of increased internationalisation/
globalisation of economic activities and generalised economic reforms with
fuller rein on market forces.
Agreed, policy reviews, adjustments, fine-tuning and strategic repositioning in
thelightofexperienceareimperative. Butthesedonotamounttopolicyreversals
nor alternative programmes in themselves.

(iv) Liberalisation and deregulation are concepts which are often used without proper
appreciation of their import. Certainly, in the Nigerian context, they do not mean
a "free-for-all" regime, the absence of regulation. This is erroneous. Properly
considered, the objectives of policy are "orderly" liberalisatio~ and "guided"
deregulation especially in the face of market inefficiencies and failures-markets,
in fact, do get cornered and rigged. Consequently, there is scope for intervention

by the regulatory/ supervisory authorities to$ive direction and effect d~irable
correction but it should be stressed that such intervention should be wellinformed.
(v)

The exchange rate has been a topical issue and a matter of concern since the
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introduction of the SAP in September, 1986. The focus of concern has been the
persistent depredation .and occasional instability of the exchange rate. This is
understandabte given the high import dependency of the country and the key
role of the exchange rate in resource allocation, the determination of relative
prices, macro-economic management etc. However, it should be stressed that the
exchange rate is a price which, under a floating regime, is determined by the
forces of supply and demand. Moreover, the exchange rate is largely a reflection
of economic fundamentals, an index of the underlying strength and health of the
economy. Seriously speaking, it cannot be fixed and sustained by administrative
fiat otherwise each muntry would compete with the other in artificially raising
its muntry's currency value if there was any real benefit to be derived from such
an exercise. In thismnnection, I wish to quote the dictum of Prof. Jacques I. Polak,
IMF Director of Research for over 20 years (1958 to 1979) namely, that ''No
countryhasanadvantageinstickingtoadisequilibriumrateforitscurrency,and
no country in the end manages to do SQ." Consequently,. if we want the naira
exchange rate to appreciate, we must work for it, must earn it through increased
productivity, export more and import iess etc.
(vi)

New to the issue of method or strategy. Some concern has been expressed over
the use of "Shock Therapy" as against a gradualist approach in effecting necessary
correction. The two areas where shock therapy has been applied are anti-inflation
policyand exchange rate realignment or stabilisation. In Ni~ria, there have been
at least six instanq!S when the shock therapy was applied:
September 1986: exchange rate realignment through the introduction of the

(S)FEM.
1986/1987: call -in of deposits with banks awaiting exchange cover or trade
arrears refinancing.
1989: transfer of pu~lic sector deposits from the banks to the CBN.
1989: abolition of the use of foreign guarantees and domiciliary account
balances as collaterals for naira loans.
5th March 1992: 42% naira devaluation.
mid- September 1992: massive issuance of stabilisation securities with
concomitant surge in interbank and other rates of interest.
ln all six instances, there was excessive money supply growth which destabilised the
foreign exchange market and exerted enormous pressure on the exchange rate.
In view of time constraint, we cannot go into the details of the then prevailing situations
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and what measures were taken. However, it is highly desirable to explain CBN'sactlon

in the two most teeent cases of shock therapy.
(a)

5th March. 1992: The following adverse developments were noted:
increasing parallel market premium to an all-time high of over 80%.
seriousand widespread malpractices and violations by operators including
selling official forex in the parallel market to make windfall profits.
inefficiency arising from multiple banking arrangements (e.g. banks compelling customers to make deposits which earned no interest).
excessive demand for official forex because of implied huge subsidy.
massive speculative activity.

(b) Mid September. 1992: The following conditions were discernible:

destabilising increase in money supply and inflation rate.
unsustainable increase in demand for forex from less than $100 million to
about $180 million per week in less than one month.
widening of parallel market premium.

massive and wide-scale speculative activi"ty by banks, foreign exchange
users as long as Naira exchange rate continued to depreciate.
While in the first case, massive corrective exchange rate action in combination
with some demand management initiative was taken, in the second case, massive
demand management action was adopted. Each had its costs in terms of depreciation and concomitant surge in interest rates respectively but they were considered
acceptable costs in order to re-establish normalcy and stability. in a situation of
serious emergency. In such circumstances, a gradualist approach was considered
to be totally irrelevant and inappropriate as it was most likely to be subverted
through further speculation and counter measures and, therefore, doomed to
failure. For international comparisons I wish to cite the examples of Sweden, midSeptember,and Britain, late October, 1992 which moved interest rates to500%-anc:r-100% respectively in order to defend their currencies.
While I acknowledge that shock therapy has its costs and that it has not been as
effective as it would have been if it had been accompanied by fiscal restraint and
other complementary measures, I should stress that if the shock treatment was not
applied, the situation wduld ha'ie got out of hand. Given the imbalances, distortions and other problems which constrain the conduct of monetary policy, the
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outcome could be optimal only by fluke. In such circumstances, it is better to talk
of "satisficing" than of optimising. The focus of policy action, therefore, is the
deliberate choice of that option which has the greatest net benefit for the economy.

(vii)

Put differently but to the same effect, the conduct of Monetary Policy in
Nigeria is a delicate balancing act involving rather tough policy choices and
difficult trade-off's between policy objectives. It is severely constrained by
lags, the problems of predictability and control and the divergence of fiscal
operations from targets. We absolutely lack fiscal discretion, we simply
have no responsibility or control over Government expenditure. That is
why the tendency to blame the CBN for all the ills of the economy including
fiscal slippages would have been laughable were it not so serious an error.Perhaps those who expect more from the CBN might give thought to
granting greater discretion to the Bank with respect to macroeconomic
policy management, with a strong,entrenchedanti-inflation mandate as for
example in New Zealand. But how feasible is this scenario at a time when
some critics are calling CBN's autonomy to question and expressing concern about its alleged wide powers?

(viii)

Doubts have been expressed from time to time on the adequacy of the
regulatory/ supervisory capacity of the CBN in the face of the phenomenal
increase in the number of market participants and the large volume and
sophistication of the financial services industry.
I wish to state that a lot has been done in recent years in enhancing not only

the regulatory /legal arrangements but also in strengthening the in-house
expertise and capacity of the CBN through recruitment and training of staff
as well as computerisation of the Banking Supervision function and developing a comprehensive off-site surveillance framework for monitoring the

performance of banks.
Moreover, in line with the far-reaching provisions of the CAMD and the
BOFID which place enormous responsibilities on directors and the top
management of banks with respect to corporate governance, it is expected
that bank directors would take a more critical, on-going interest in monitoring the performance of their institutions not only with respect to the
achievement of their corpotate objectives but also the observance of relevant laws. In this connection, bank directors are expected to act in a self-
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regulating, quasi-auditing capacity.
Indeed, the achievement of an efficient, safe and sound banking system
cannot be accomplished without the cooperation of the banks themselves.
Consequently, all hands must be on deck. And when the banks violate the
ground rules we penalise them. As a matter of fact we penalise banks all the
time but we do not think that this is a matter to be published on the pages
of newspapers.

(ix)

The question is often asked as to who we owe our allegiance: the IFI's, the
Bretton Woods Institutions, external creditors or to Nigeria. For the
avoidance of doubt, I state that Nigeria is our constituency and it is to
Nigeria we owe our allegiance. Our policies are entirely our responsibility;
they are not externally imposed. However, as members of the World Bank
and the IMF, our performance is subject to periodic and special reviews and
consultation in an atmosphere of mutual accommodation and equality.
Moreover, the external creditors do have a rightto know how much we earn
and how we are managing our resources if we are ask!ng them for more
generous concessions (e.g. debt cancellation) perhapsattheexpenseof their •
own tax payers.

(x)

In the light of the present state of the country's economy after six years of
SAP, the questions may be posed: where do we go from here? Is economic
development in Nigeria an impossible task?
Viewed from both internal and global perspectives, we have come a long
way. Significant achievements have been made but the unfinished agenda
and the list of concerns are formidable.

(xi)

Consequently, the following new initiatives are called for:
(a)
more robust external debt management to secure more favourable
terms, debt and debt service reduction.
(b)

improved productivity and qualitative growth.

(c)

enabling macroeconomic and policy environment.

(d)

export for survival, recovery and growth.

~,
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(e)

credible system of rewards and penalties including poverty alleviation
measures (social safety nets) redistributive equity especially in sharing the
burden of structural adjusbnent.

(0

enhanced implementation of policy measures.

(g)

fiscal viability- restraint, prudence, austerity and improved ability to tax
and collect revenue.

(h)

channelling the elements of the Nigerian factor (a euphemism for the worst
in the Nigerian) to positive national endeavours and goals.

(xii)

Now to the prospects for monetary policy. The prognosis, perhaps a
credible scen,1rio, for the Third Republic is that although the country would
continue to contend with the problem of the fiscal deficit, pressures on the
domestic price level, the balance of payments and the naira exchange rate,
a more stable regime would emerge in the medium term. This. scenario is
posited on the evolution of a monetary policy framework which relies
increasingly on indirect instruments and whose design and conduct become more sophisticated and confident and less episodic and cataclysmic.
Then, fine-tuning which involves small changes or adjustments, rather than
path-finding, involving large disturbances and oscillations would characterise the conduct of monetary policy. Another important assumption is
that in recognition of the fact that our economic problems have deep fiscal
roots, a less inflationary way of financing the large fiscal deficit through
non-bank sources would be found. Ultimately, fiscal viability, involving the
substantial reduction or elimination of the fiscal deficit (a function of both
revenue mobilisation and expenditure control measures) would have to be
achieved if domestic price, exchange rate and interest rate stability and
therefore, meaningful growth, are to be attained.

(xiii)

I also expect a more efficient, sound and stable banking industry -one that
is more customer oriented and responsive to the needs of the country. This
state of affairs would arise from the implementation of the prudential
guidelines, the institution of more robust supervisory remedies to deal with
the problems of distressed banks, and the emplacement of a more level
playing field with significant reduction both in arbitrage opportunities-
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and the concomitant rent-seeking activity- and in the discretion (and I dare
say indiscretion) exercised by individual players-a moderation of the
prevailing economic Darwinism.
(xiv)

As economists there is an urgent need for all of us to return to the micro
economic foundations of our discipline. For a better comprehension of how
things work in real life under the prevailing market-based system there is
need to fully understand concepts such as marginalism, opportunity cost,
utility, economic efficiency, consumer's surplus, convertibility, purchasing
power parity, market equilibrium, oligopolistic pricing, collusion, the
theories of the second best, rational expectations, "crowding out", the price
auction model, social choice, satisficing, the functioning of the informal
sector (underground economy). Greater attention should also be given to
Political Economy with respect to the analysis of economic power, its
sources, limits, uses and abuses as well as redistributive equity, social safety

nets etc.
(xv)

Moreover, the need for close collaboration between policy economists in
academia and policy formulators and practitioners in Government for
mutual clarification and strengthening is greater now than ever before.
There is also an urgent need for the design of a macro-econometric model
for policy formulation and evaluation.

(xvi)

Finally, I stand before you to acknowledge that we are not infallible.
Indeed, it would benaiveand dishonestto claim otherwise. While I consider
that we have enormous scope for improvement, I at times feel desolated that
our problems have tended to be overstated while our performance in the
conduct of monetary and banking policies has been consistently understated. This is, however, not a call for conceit or complacency. It is a call for
greater understanding and support from academia through rigorous, objective and constructive appraisal of policy measures and proffering credible
alternatives. On this challenging note, I conclude my presentation.

2ND DECEMBER, 1992

TABLE
MONEY AND BANKING STATISTICS
1985

1986

1987

1989

1988

1990

1991

FintHalf

1992
. (A)

(B)

Money and Credit (=N= Million):

1.

Money Supply (Ml)

13,267.8

13,105.0

14,905.9

21,148.6

25,697.6

37,233.7

49,364.5

62,463.8

2;

Quasi Money

10,550.8

11,487.7

15,088.7

21,631.7

20,525.3

27,699.0

36,788.0

45$6.7

3.

Aggregate Credit (net)

32,680.3

36,820.3

42,082.0

52,060.5

52,3201

57,615.0

83,823.7

92,513.1

4.

Credit to Government (net)

18,980.1

19,455.3

22,265.0'

26,'170.7

21,557.3

21,043.0

38,498.5

41,7811

5.

Credit to the Private Sector

13,700.2

17,365.0

19,817.0

25,089.8

30,762.9

36,631.0

45,3251

50,731.9

17.6

11

13.7

41.9

21.5

44.9

32.6

26.5

1.5

26.8

45.3

10.4

Growth in Money and Credit(%):

1.

(0

Money Supply

2.

Aggregate Credit (net)

5.0

12.7

14.3

23.7

3.

Credit to Government (net)

4.3

2.5

14.4

21.1

20.1

40.8

82.9

8.5

4.

Credit to the Private Sector

5.9

26.8

14.1

26.6

22.6

19.1

23.7

11.9

-

50.0

50.0

50.0

50.0

50.0

-

50.0

41.9

45.4

46.0

48.7

51.4

52.6

50.0

50.0

50.0

50.0

50.0

50.0

45:J

57.8

54.8

57.3

58.1

':ll.7

-

Sectoral Distribution of Credit (%):
1.

2

By Commercial Banks to Priority Seeton:
(i)

Target

(ii)

Achieved

-

By Merchant Banks to Priority Sectors:
(i)

Target

(ii)

Achieved

-

-
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